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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 While on supervised release, Nathaniel Thomas was convicted of, among other 
things, knowingly possessing a firearm in violation of both federal and Virgin Islands 
law.  The District Court sentenced Thomas for his most recent convictions and for 
violating the terms of his supervised release, and ordered that the latter sentence was to 
run consecutive to the former.  On appeal, Thomas argues that his firearms convictions 
are not supported by the evidence and that the District Court erred by ordering his 
violation of supervised release sentence to run consecutively to his sentence for the 
underlying convictions.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
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I.1 
 Thomas had been convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), manufacture of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1), and maintaining a drug facility in violation of 19 V.I.C. § 608b.  He was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, followed by a period of supervised release.  After 
he had been released from prison but before his supervised release had ended, he was 
involved in a shootout at a gas station, and a grand jury indicted him for the following: 
(1) knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); (2) knowingly possessing a firearm while not being authorized 
to do so during the commission of crimes of violence—namely, discharging a firearm in 
a public place not in self-defense and assault in the third degree as charged in the fourth 
and fifth counts—in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a); (3) reckless endangerment in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 625(a); (4) willfully discharging a firearm in a public place not in 
self-defense in violation of 23 V.I.C. § 479(a); and (5) assault with a deadly weapon with 
intent to injure another in violation of 14 V.I.C. § 297(2). 
 At trial, the Government’s case consisted of video footage from the gas station 
security cameras, testimony of a gas station employee and police officers who responded 
to the scene or otherwise worked on the investigation, and stipulations that were read into 
                                              
1 Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the procedural 
posture to date, we only include what is necessary to explain our decision.   
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the record.2  The defense presented witness testimony on the events leading up to and 
during the shooting, including testimony from Thomas himself.  On the night in question, 
Thomas was driving Kareem Mathis to a strip club to pick up a set of keys.  At some 
point during the drive, a silver Ford Explorer began aggressively tailing Thomas’s 
vehicle.  The Explorer was unrelenting, so Thomas continued past the strip club to an 
adjacent gas station, where he pulled in and stopped his car.  The Explorer stopped 
behind him and then began backing up as Thomas exited his vehicle, and gunfire erupted.  
Although the security camera footage does not establish who initiated the shooting, 
witnesses testified that someone in the Explorer was the first to fire and that Thomas did 
not have a gun when he exited his car.  Thomas took cover behind a cluster of parked 
cars, and witnesses testified that an individual named Raheem Charlery then handed 
Thomas a gun.  Thomas emerged from his place behind the parked cars and ran after the 
Explorer while firing the weapon that Charlery gave him.  Once the Explorer had exited 
the gas station parking lot, Thomas stopped chasing after it.  Thomas went back to his 
car, and, according to witness testimony, he immediately returned the gun to Charlery.  
 At Thomas’s request, the District Court gave the jury an instruction on the defense 
of justification.  Nonetheless, the jury found Thomas guilty of the first three counts, 
knowing possession of a firearm in violation of federal and Virgin Islands law, and 
reckless endangerment.  Although it did not find him guilty of the fourth and fifth 
                                              
2 Two of the three stipulations provided that Thomas was not authorized to carry a 
firearm at the time of the events in question and that Thomas had a prior felony 
conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 
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counts,3 the jury nonetheless found that he possessed a firearm in violation of Virgin 
Islands law “during the commission of crimes of violence, that is, discharging a firearm 
and assault third degree [sic], as charged in Counts 4 and 5.”  SA 1B.4  The District Court 
sentenced him to a prison term of ninety-six months on Count One, fifteen years on 
Count Two, and five years on Count Three.  The Court ordered that the terms of 
imprisonment for Counts Two and Three run concurrently with each other and run 
consecutively to the term of imprisonment for Count One. 
 In a separate hearing, the District Court found that, based on these convictions, 
Thomas had violated the terms of the supervised release he was serving pursuant to his 
earlier drug-related convictions.  The Court then sentenced Thomas to twelve months’ 
and one day’s imprisonment for this violation.  Although Thomas’s counsel argued that 
the Court should run the sentence for the violation of supervised release concurrently 
with the sentences in the underlying matter, the District Court found it “appropriate to 
impose [the] sentence [for Thomas’s violation of supervised release] consecutively.”  
App. 161–62.  In making this decision, the Court stated the following: 
. . .  The Court does not agree that simply because [the 
sentence for the underlying criminal activity] is a sentence 
[Thomas’s counsel] believe[s] was maybe more than enough 
or, indeed, at least sufficient that this is grounds not to run the 
sentences consecutively for an offense that this Court views 
                                              
3 The jury did not reach a verdict on the fourth count, discharging a firearm in a public 
place not in self-defense, and it acquitted him on the final count, assault with a deadly 
weapon. 
4 Because this is a consolidated appeal, each case has its own set of appendices.  For 
convenience, we cite to the Appendix in 18-3024 using the convention “A __,” the 
Supplemental Appendix in 18-3024 using “SA __,” and the Appendix in 18-3186 using 
“AA __.” 
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as a separate offense, a violation of the Court’s order with 
regard to supervised release. 
I think it is important . . . that individuals know and 
recognize that the Court[’s] orders are to be followed and that 
it is, indeed, a violation subject to sanction for a violation of 
those conditions set by the Court.  And this is one such case. 
The Court also takes note of the fact . . . that the 
recommendation [in the guidelines] is that those sentences for 
violations of supervised release be consecutive to the 
sentence for the underlying crime.   
So, the Court rejects the rationale that has been advanced 
with regard to either the length of the underlying sentence as 
a basis or as the basis for coming to a different conclusion in 
this matter. 
AA 162–63.  Thomas timely appealed from both his firearms-related convictions and the 
sentence imposed for his violation of the terms of his supervised release. 
II.5 
 On appeal, Thomas challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
convictions for knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and knowingly possessing a firearm while not being 
authorized to do so during the commission of crimes of violence in violation of 14 V.I.C. 
§ 2253(a).  He also challenges the District Court’s order imposing the sentence for his 
supervised release violation to run consecutively with his sentences for the underlying 
crimes. 
A.6 
                                              
5 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
6 When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e must sustain the 
jury’s verdict ‘if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, to uphold the jury’s decision.’”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 
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 With regard to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his underlying 
convictions, Thomas argues that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
was entitled to the defense of justification by necessity by establishing all of the elements 
of that defense.  He claims that the burden then shifted to the Government to disprove the 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and, because the Government did not do so, 
Thomas’s convictions for the first and second counts must be dismissed.  We disagree. 
 A justification defense is available if the evidence shows that a jury could 
reasonably conclude each of the following: 
(1) that the defendant was under an unlawful and present 
threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that he did not 
recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be 
forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) that he had no 
reasonable legal alternative to both the criminal act and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm; and (4) that there was a 
direct causal relationship between the criminal act and the 
avoidance of the threatened harm. 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 365 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. 
Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 540–41 (3d Cir. 1991)).  The defense is “construed narrowly,” 
United States v. Alston, 526 F.3d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2008), and the defendant is required “to 
                                              
F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 
170 (3d Cir. 2003)).  This standard is “particularly deferential,” United States v. 
Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165, 179 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted), and “the verdict must be upheld as long as it does not ‘fall below the threshold 
of bare rationality.’”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431 (quoting Coleman v. 
Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012)).  Moreover, we “do not reweigh the evidence or 
assess witness credibility.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted). 
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meet a high level of proof to establish the defense,” Lewis, 620 F.3d at 365 (quoting 
Paolello, 951 F.2d at 542).  Here, the jury was properly instructed regarding this defense. 
 As a threshold matter, we note that Thomas’s argument rests on an incorrect 
understanding of the law.  Although he correctly states that he bore the burden of 
establishing each element of the justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence, 
see United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 350 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting “a rule that places 
the burden of persuasion on the defendant with regard to a justification defense to a 
felon-in-possession charge”), the law does not provide for a burden shift that would 
require the government to disprove the elements of the defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt once the defense had established them by a preponderance of the evidence.7  
Moreover, Thomas never made this argument in the District Court, nor did he object to 
the Court’s charge, which instructed the jury that Thomas was required to prove the 
                                              
7  Thomas cites to a number of cases for the proposition that a burden shift exists.  
First, he cites to Paolello, where the parties agreed that the defendant would have the 
burden of production on the justification defense and, if he satisfied that burden, the 
government would then be required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Paolello, 951 F.2d at 544.  Because the issue was not properly before us in that case, we 
did not pass upon it, id., and the parties’ agreement there has no bearing on the burden 
here.  The other three circuit court cases to which Thomas cites hold only that the burden 
is on the defendant to prove the justification defense by a preponderance of the evidence 
and do not even remotely suggest that the burden shifts to the government to disprove the 
defense by beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Lewis, 620 F.3d at 364 n.5 (concluding that 
“the burden rested with [the defendant] to establish his eligibility for the instruction by a 
preponderance of the evidence”); Dodd, 225 F.3d at 350; United States v. Deleveaux, 205 
F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendant is required to prove 
justification by a preponderance of the evidence).  In fact, in Dodd, we explicitly rejected 
the argument that we should adopt the same burden allocation for justification as we have 
for entrapment, i.e., that the government should have the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply.  See 225 F.3d at 349–50. 
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elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.  Therefore, this argument 
was waived. 
 To the extent that Thomas argues that his convictions must be vacated because he 
established all four elements of the defense of justification by necessity, we conclude that 
a rational trier of fact could have found that Thomas failed to establish at least three of 
those elements.  The first element requires that the defendant be “under an unlawful and 
present threat of death or serious bodily injury.”  Lewis, 620 F.3d at 365 (citing Paolello, 
951 F.2d at 540–41).  In Alston, we defined “present threat” and explained that “[o]nly in 
rare circumstances will anything but an ‘immediate emergency’ constitute a present 
threat.”  526 F.3d at 95 n.7; see also id. at 95–96 (equating the requirement that the threat 
be “present” to a requirement that it be “imminent” and providing examples from other 
circuits of situations in which the immediacy requirement is met).  Because the evidence 
established that Thomas came into possession of the firearm when he was safely hidden 
between parked cars and while the Explorer was backing away from him, a jury could 
have reasonably concluded that the threat was not “present.” 
 A rational trier of fact could also conclude that Thomas failed to satisfy the second 
element, “that he did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced 
to engage in criminal conduct.”  Lewis, 620 F.3d at 365 (citing Paolello, 951 F.2d at 540–
41).  In doing so, the jury may have credited the gas station’s surveillance footage, which 
clearly shows Thomas running toward, and firing at, the Explorer. 
 Finally, the jury could have rationally concluded that Thomas failed to show the 
third element, that he had no reasonable legal alternative to both the criminal act and the 
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avoidance of the threatened harm.  Thomas was not harmed while hiding behind the 
group of parked cars, and the Explorer appeared to be retreating before he came into 
possession of the weapon.  Therefore, the jury could have determined that Thomas did 
have a legal alternative to possessing the weapon, namely, remaining hidden behind the 
cars.  Because the jury could have reasonably concluded that Thomas failed to establish 
any one of three of the elements of the justification defense, we will affirm Thomas’s 
convictions on the first and second counts. 
B.8 
 Next, Thomas argues that the District Court erred by ordering his sentence for the 
violation of his supervised release to run consecutively to his sentence for the underlying 
convictions.  Specifically, he contends that (1) U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 
5G1.3(d) requires the District Court to consider the length of a prior undischarged 
sentence in determining whether the sentence for a violation of supervised release should 
run concurrently or consecutively, (2) the District Court improperly concluded that it 
could not consider that length in making its decision, and (3) the Court improperly 
concluded that a sentence for a violation of supervised release must always run 
consecutively to the sentence imposed for the underlying conviction.  We disagree with 
his characterization of the guidelines and of the District Court’s reasoning. 
                                              
8 We typically review the imposition of a particular sentence concurrently or 
consecutively for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 
2002).  However, because Thomas challenges the construction of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, our review is plenary.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d), which applies in cases in which a defendant has had his or 
her supervised release revoked based on the criminal conviction, provides: 
[T]he sentence for the instant offense[, i.e., the criminal 
conviction that constitutes the supervised release violation,] 
may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, 
or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of 
imprisonment[, i.e., the sentence imposed for the revocation,] 
to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense. 
The commentary to § 5G1.3(d) states that, in deciding whether to impose a consecutive 
sentence, “the court should consider,” among other factors, “[t]he type … and length of 
the prior undischarged sentence[.]”  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) cmt. 4(A)(ii) (emphasis added).  
This language is explicitly permissive, and nothing else in either § 5G1.3(d) or its 
commentary mandated that the District Court consider the length of Thomas’s sentence 
for his underlying convictions in deciding whether the sentence of his violation of 
supervised release would run consecutively to that sentence.  Moreover, the commentary 
specifically “recommends that the sentence for the instant offense be imposed 
consecutively to the sentence imposed for the revocation,” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(d) cmt. 4(C) 
(emphasis added), which is exactly what the District Court did here, see AA 163 (noting 
this recommendation). 
 The District Court did not conclude that it could not consider the length of the 
sentence for the underlying convictions when determining whether to impose the 
sentence for his violation of supervised release consecutively or concurrently.  Instead, it 
merely did not agree with Thomas’s counsel that the length of the undischarged sentence 
was controlling and warranted a concurrent sentence.  The Court expressed its view that 
 12 
 
the “important” consideration was that “individuals know and recognize that the 
Court[’s] orders are to be followed.”  AA 162. 
 Finally, contrary to Thomas’s assertion, the District Court did not conclude that a 
sentence for a violation of a term of supervised release could never run concurrently with 
the sentence for the underlying conviction.  Instead, the District Court expressly cabined 
its reasoning to this particular case when it stated that “this is one such case” in which 
consecutive sentences are appropriate.  AA 163.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
sentence imposed for his violation of the terms of his supervised release.9 
III. 
                                              
9  Prior to oral argument, we asked that counsel be prepared to address whether the 
District Court should have considered U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 in deciding whether to run 
Thomas’s sentence on his federal conviction (Count One) concurrently or consecutively 
with his local convictions (Counts Two and Three) and whether its failure to do so 
amounts to plain error.  We also asked for supplemental briefing on that issue and the 
applicability of United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826 (3d Cir. 2000), following 
argument.  In Simmonds, we noted that if Simmonds had committed his offenses in a 
state and not the territory of the Virgin Islands, he would have been sentenced on his 
federal and state offenses separately in federal and state court, and the federal court 
would have referred to § 5G1.3.  Id. at 835 n.7.  We noted, however, that “[i]t is only 
because uniquely in the Virgin Islands a defendant can be convicted of both the federal 
and the territorial offenses at the same time in federal court that the application of § 
5G1.3 in such a situation is even debatable.”  Id.  But regardless of whether § 5G1.3 
applies in cases in which a defendant is sentenced for federal and local convictions at the 
same time, we conclude that the District Court’s failure to consider that provision was not 
plain error. 
 “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and affects the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. Flores-
Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  By its terms, § 5G1.3 governs the “Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant 
Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment or Anticipated State Term of 
Imprisonment.”  As the applicability of § 5G1.3 in this context, where there was no 
undischarged term of imprisonment, is “debatable,” Simmonds, 235 F.3d at 835 n.7, and 
not clear or obvious, the Court did not plainly err in not referring to it. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in Appeal 
No. 18-3024 and the sentence imposed for Thomas’s violation of the terms of his 
supervised release in Appeal No. 18-3186. 
